The Ghosts of Langley Read online




  Also by John Prados

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  The U.S. Special Forces: What Everyone Needs to Know

  A Streetcar Named Pleiku: Vietnam 1965, a Turning Point (longform e-book)

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  The Family Jewels: The CIA, Secrecy, and Presidential Power

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  In Country: Remembering the Vietnam War (written and edited)

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  Normandy Crucible: The Decisive Battle that Shaped World War II in Europe

  How the Cold War Ended: Debating and Doing History

  William Colby and the CIA: The Secret Wars of a Controversial Spymaster

  Vietnam: The History of an Unwinnable War, 1945–1975

  Safe for Democracy: The Secret Wars of the CIA

  Hoodwinked: The Documents That Reveal How Bush Sold Us a War

  Inside the Pentagon Papers (written and edited with Margaret Pratt Porter)

  The White House Tapes: Eavesdropping on the President (written and edited)

  Lost Crusader: The Secret Wars of CIA Director William Colby

  America Confronts Terrorism (written and edited)

  The Blood Road: The Ho Chi Minh Trail and the Vietnam War

  Presidents’ Secret Wars: CIA and Pentagon Covert Operations from World War II Through the Persian Gulf

  Combined Fleet Decoded: The Secret History of U.S. Intelligence and the Japanese Navy in World War II

  The Hidden History of the Vietnam War

  Valley of Decision: The Siege of Khe Sanh (with Ray W. Stubbe)

  Keepers of the Keys: A History of the National Security Council from Truman to Bush

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  © 2017 by John Prados

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  The New Press, 120 Wall Street, 31st floor, New York, NY 10005

  Published in the United States by The New Press, New York, 2017

  Distributed by Perseus Distribution

  ISBN 978-1-62097-089-8 (e-book)

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  10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

  So do we pass the ghosts that haunt us later in our lives; they sit undramatically by the roadside like poor beggars, and we see them only from the corners of our eyes, if we see them at all. The idea that they have been waiting there for us rarely if ever crosses our minds. Yet they do wait, and when we have passed, they gather up their bundles of memory and fall in behind, treading in our footsteps and catching up. . . .

  —Stephen King, Wizard and Glass

  To Marilyn Young,

  friend and colleague over these many years

  CONTENTS

  Preface

  A Note to the Reader

  Acronyms

  Prologue: Ghosts in the Machine

  1.The House That Allen Built

  2.Zealots and Schemers

  3.Stars and Meteors

  4.Crises

  5.The Consiglieri

  6.The Sheriffs

  7.The Headless Horseman

  8.A Failed Exorcist

  9.Jacob Marley’s Ghosts

  10.The Flying Dutchman

  Notes

  Bibliography

  Index

  PREFACE

  DONALD J. TRUMP MADE THE FIRST OFFICIAL STOP OF HIS PRESIDENCY on January 21, 2017, at Langley, the Central Intelligence Agency’s Virginia headquarters. The agency is headed into its seventieth year of existence. One can only imagine what was going through Trump’s mind as his minions took him there. This bold visit showed chutzpah, for President Trump had taken office having already picked several fights with America’s spooks.

  Rather than articulating any well-considered perspective on the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), other U.S. spy outfits, or even the general subject of espionage, Mr. Trump had accused its director of being a leaker, the officers of behaving like Nazis, and the agency of being as hopelessly wrong as it was when George W. Bush wanted to know if Saddam Hussein had nuclear weapons. Its cherry-picked appreciations had helped Bush lead the nation to war. Now the agency—in combination with the director of national intelligence (DNI), the National Security Agency (NSA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and others—was saying that Russia had intervened in U.S. electoral politics. Russian spies and cyberwizards had infiltrated the computers of American politicians and staffs, collecting embarrassing information, some of which had been used to smear Trump’s Democratic opponent Senator Hillary Clinton. What the Russians might have held on to for the purpose of directly manipulating Trump remained unknown, but the intelligence agencies had some illustrative examples that they showed the president-elect before his inauguration.

  Donald Trump had already displayed an extraordinarily thin skin for an aspirant to the presidency. His standard tactic had been to deny every charge, even when documented on paper or film or tape, while attacking those stating or reporting the information. Trump’s routine tactics were to attack right back and do so without regard for the truth. Thus he had ruthlessly exploited allegations that Hillary Clinton, who had used a private e-mail server while secretary of state, had been guilty of revealing secret information.

  When the FBI could find no evidence of that but reported some of Clinton’s messages missing, Mr. Trump had outrageously invited the Russians to hack her. Trump’s differences with U.S. intelligence began when the DNI and others started to warn of Russian intervention. After his election victory, Mr. Trump strongly criticized the CIA when officials went to brief him, and he refused to receive the President’s Daily Brief, one of the nation’s foremost intelligence products. Soon Trump was insulting U.S. “intelligence,” saying they needed extra time to concoct phony stories before meeting him, then demanding the resignations of the leaders of the principal U.S. agencies.

  On January 21 there was already bad blood between the new president and his spy agencies. On one level, Trump’s gambit in going to speak at the CIA was like walking into a den of vipers. Indeed, the president wore an overcoat and never took it off, and he left after just fifteen minutes. Trump could have been wearing a bulletproof vest under the greatcoat. More likely he never intended to make more than a whistle-stop, a political stunt to distract attention from the massive Women’s March going on outside at that very moment, in hundreds of cities and towns in the United States and across the world, not least the U.S. capital, Washington, D.C., where the crowd matched those of the greatest protests in the 1960s and 1970s against the Vietnam War.

  President Trump’s appearance at CIA headquarters took place while the protesters gathered. The bad blood meant the president had an opportunity to mend fences. But the event took on an odd character. One of the main features of the Old Headquarters Building at Langley is what is called the Memorial Wall. The Wall has a star chiseled on it for each CIA officer who has given his or her life for the nation. Some of the stars have no names, for the persons they represent are considered undercover even in death. At the moment, there are 117 stars chiseled there. The Wall has special meaning for America’s spies. President Trump entered the building and stood in front of the Wall to make his speech.

  Trumpian bombast soon sent the president off on tangents, boasting of his “intelligence,” his inaugural crowds, and denouncing the media. Some CIA folk were angered by Trump’s use of the Memorial Wall to stage what was essentially a political event. His only reference to the Wall was to his standing in front of that “very, very special” monument. As if nothing had happened between the spooks and their leader, Trump called his spies “very, very special people.” He implied a peace offer. The president made the point that he’d selected the CIA for his very first public event, accused the media of making up the feud between him and the spooks, and declaimed, “I just want you to know, I am so behind you.” Or again, “I love you, I respect you, there’s nobody I respect more.” Trump intoned that he would give the spies so much backing, they would want less, and he presumed that most of them—at one of America’s less political agencies—had voted for him. The jocularity seemed awkward, but it was pure Trump.

  But more important are the bits and pieces of what President Trump said that truly concerned the CIA and U.S. intelligence. Great things, of course. In terms of concrete aims, there was one, “radical Islamic terrorism.” In a clearer hint, he spoke of Iraq and Syria and the group called ISIS, oil, a
nd how the United States should have kept it when we fought there before, but “maybe we’ll have another chance.” The wars had gone on for longer than any America has fought before. More generally the president said, “We have not used the real abilities that we have.” Equally ominously, “We have to start winning again.”

  For what does President Trump want to use those capabilities? His modus operandi, on subject after subject since announcing his plans to run for president, had been to assert that he had a strategy but refuse to reveal what it might be. Off-the-cuff remarks promising one thing or another substitute. His cry of “America First” implied a withdrawal from the world scene. Conversely, at various times the new U.S. leader has promised to put more of the CIA’s operations officers into the field, to smite enemies harder than ever—in particular in Syria and Iraq as indicated above. Not long into his presidency he answered Syrian government chemical attacks against citizens with American cruise missiles. Trump promised tortures even more severe than those of the CIA under George W. Bush, to the degree that former spy chieftains warned Trump he’d have to bring his own pail to interrogation sessions. Since his CIA speech, President Trump has told an interviewer that he will defer to the views of his agency director and his secretary of defense but that he, personally, thinks torture works well. The president repeated that formula at the press appearance marking his first meeting with a foreign leader, Prime Minister Theresa May of the United Kingdom, even as the British leader rejected torture.

  Meanwhile, President Trump reached outside the intelligence establishment for his CIA director, appointing Michael Pompeo, a West Point graduate and Tea Party supporter who, as a congressional representative from Kansas, had sat on the House Intelligence Committee and called for the execution of Edward Snowden. His first director of national intelligence, Dan Coats, was another politician cut from similar cloth. In an expression of incoherence, Trump prohibited the top U.S. spy (Coats) from the National Security Council, while putting the CIA boss (Pompeo) on the guest list. That lasted only a few weeks, but it is anyone’s guess where this is headed.

  Though Trump stumbled through his visit to the CIA and told the crowd he loved them, the “reconciliation” seemed hollow—deserving of those demeaning quotation marks. Thus the Trump presidency began with a contradiction: a cleavage between the spies who populate Langley and the man who inhabits the White House. How deep that chasm remains will be revealed by events.

  The agencies in this troubled relationship are going to be called upon for even greater efforts on covert operations. Mr. Trump saying the CIA had been “restrained” could only have reminded many of those gathered by the wall of heroes that the agency had baggage of its own. There are ghosts stalking the halls at Langley. At the moment of Trump’s visit, the CIA was still in the throes of waves of recrimination resulting from the tactics—including secret overseas prisons and torture—that it had resorted to in the war on terror. Its leaders had attempted to evade responsibility for those acts. Senior officers had had to give up ambitions for top jobs because of their links to these projects. Contract psychologists who had helped administer the torture were being sued at that very moment. Yet President Trump wanted more.

  The things Trump wants from the Central Intelligence Agency are very much like what the agency has done in the past. Before exploring what the future may hold, we need to delve into those times. The Ghosts of Langley excavates that past. It is a history of the CIA viewed through the eyes of key figures, focusing particularly on covert operations. It tells how the agency, over seven decades, has resisted—and finally decoupled itself from—government accountability. Slowly at first, but with increasing momentum, officials have broken fetters of all types. The pace reached a breakneck speed with torture and black prisons in the war on terror. A climax came when the Senate intelligence committee tried to investigate those things. Efforts to defeat outside attempts to enforce accountability, in the recent past, have escalated to highly troubling and even criminal acts.

  This is the first book to relate the agency’s current behavior toward authority to its founding and earlier history. The Ghosts of Langley puts fresh light on classic agency covert operations from Poland to Hungary, Indonesia to Iran-Contra, the Bay of Pigs too. It also lifts the veil covering the CIA’s role in the war on terror, going beyond the actions to the coverup. The account here follows the covert operations and shows how CIA lawyers have enabled them.

  Even the CIA’s own lawyers believed its original charter did not permit covert operations. Top agency officials found themselves defending against former supporters, even as early as 1952, when Russian adversaries tore off their cloaks and revealed themselves behind the fictive anti-Soviet partisan movement the CIA had been duped into supporting. Spies and stratagems have failed repeatedly, at times spectacularly. The CIA’s secret funding of the National Student Association became a big scandal during Lyndon Johnson’s presidency. In the mid-1970s, the inquiries by the Church and Pike committees in the U.S. Congress deeply embarrassed the spooks, an embarrassment exceeded only by the controversies swirling around alleged obstruction of justice flowing from the CIA’s secret prisons in the past decade. In their memoirs, agency insiders largely focus on their own careers or on one or a few episodes in this story. Outside observers and analysts most often narrate one striking project or campaign among the secret wars. Historians covering the agency’s entire history have so much ground to cover, they tend to tread lightly on deeper examinations.

  But America’s spies have a heritage, one that is missing from these accounts. Intelligence agents work for an organization that looks back as well as forward. The CIA honors its heroes, laments its fallen, regrets its dupes and disasters. The examples of past spooks are always there to encourage—and to warn—the current generation of CIA officers. For this reason, Ghosts of Langley follows the exploits (or misadventures) of the great, the good, and the misguided. Instead of adopting a straight chronological approach, this account groups the spies by character types and presents their stories as lenses showing the larger picture of the agency’s evolution.

  I have employed the metaphor ghosts quite deliberately. The ghosts that inhabit Langley headquarters may not be corporeal, but these individuals and others like them are exemplars. The legends of the forebears furnish illustrations for today—and tomorrow. They are both good, like Jennifer Matthews or Eloise Page, and bad, say Dewey Clarridge or Jim Mitchell. Some—like Robert Ames, perhaps—are sad, heavy with potential unfulfilled. Langley has seen them all. Its halls echo with the footsteps of past spymasters and their henchmen—and henchwomen. The CIA used to picture itself as America’s primo Cold War agency. Had it not reached so far and endeavored so much, it would have fewer ghosts. Spymasters have tried to lighten the atmosphere, speaking of headquarters as a “campus,” as if this were some university and not an agency practicing dark arts. The image of a haunted house fits much better. Indeed, every day that the militarization of the CIA increases, the agency is haunted even more by its drift away from the classic arts of espionage and intelligence analysis. Those who advocated a peacetime intelligence agency for America would themselves be haunted—by what their offspring has become.

  Chronicles of the Central Intelligence Agency have conventionally focused entirely on the derring-do of operatives. A major theme here is how the operations, especially the failed ones, have driven the spies to contrive arguments and explanations they have relied upon—repeatedly—to escape from criticism and accountability. The narrative will show that in the most recent period the CIA reached new heights in this art of rationalization. You will encounter spy chieftains and operators but also visit little-known nooks of agency history. The growing power of lawyers at the agency is manifest. The oversight and control of covert operations have been critically dependent on a regulatory framework interpreted, in the first instance, by lawyers. In The Ghosts of Langley, you will see the operatives in their relation to the Delphic interpreters of regulation. The agency’s treatment of women officers is an exemplary case. It is critical to identify the framework under which the CIA labors, and the ghosts give us new eyes to glimpse the stages of its history.